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INTRODUCTION 
Background – The amount of sensitive data 
within organizations continues to grow 
exponentially. This data is being shared between 
billions of hosts on laptops, smartphones, and 
much more. Cyber criminals are aware of potential 
vulnerabilities on these hosts and are driven by a 
wide range of motives from financial gain to 
terrorism. However, preventing against cyber 
attacks can come at a steep cost. There are many 
aspects of cyber security and this research 
focuses on the vulnerability maintenance aspect. 
Importance – 90+% of cyber intrusions exploit 
known vulnerabilities on a host. Currently, many 
organizations implement simple and often 
“toothless” policies where risks are usually 
accepted when patches are not available. 
Constructing a firm policy that targets and 
eliminates dangerous vulnerabilities and monitors 
low impact vulnerabilities provides organizations 





Previous Work – Hou (2015), Afful-Dadzie 
(2012), and Allen (2014) have all explored 
methods for creating optimal cyber security 
policies. Yet, the previous methods made 
unrealistic cost assumptions and were based on 
methods that were potentially to complicated to 
seem transparent to officials. This research 
adopts metrics from Hou (2015) and imputation 
methods from Afful-Dadzie (2012). 
METHODS Severity Risk Levels – 
 
S1 = Low 
S2 = Medium 
S3 = High 
S4 = Critical 
S5 = Compromised 
 
Actions –  
 
1. Do Nothing – Allow the host to operate with 
no intervention (possibly auto patch is on). 
 
2. Research Accept – Hou (2015) indicates 
manual reviewing has been conducted on the 
host and vulnerability will be fixed if there is a 
solution available. If not, the vulnerability will 
be placed on risk accepted list, potentially 
waiting multiple months before elimination. 
 
3. Research Reject – Upgrading needs an 
average 10 labor hours of work with a 100% 
chance of eliminating the top two levels. 
 
4. Remediation – Host is placed on firewalled 
list and banned from network access. 
1. Introduced two new actions 
a. Research Reject – Upgrading 
b. Remediation 
2. More accurate cost assumptions 
a. Based on first-hand knowledge of costs 
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FUTURE WORK 
• Break down the Nessus data by individual 
operating systems 
• Re-evaluate metrics for defining the severity risk 
level of a host 
• Case study of policy with College of Engineering 
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GOALS 
1. Create a improved cyber maintenance policy for 
the College of Engineering to potentially save 
hundreds of thousands of dollars annually. 
2. Document more realistic cost assumptions and 
decision options than previous work. 
3. Complete a successful case study of our policy 
and document any savings. 
Counts and Transitions Table 
Research Accept 
RESULTS 
Process –  
1. Data Extraction: Retrieved and formatted 22 
months of Nessus scan data provided by The 
Ohio State University. Roughly over 2 million 
vulnerabilities were analyzed.   
 
2. Data Imputation: Afful-Dadzie (2012) 
explored mean based data imputation which 
was used in this research to replace missing 
values. 
 
3. Counts & Transitions: Hou (2015) used R-
code to tabulate transition tables. This 
research utilized Microsoft Excel VBA to 
cleanse the data and then tabulate the 
transition tables. 
 
4. Policy Generation: We use the probabilities of 
the counts and transitions to create an 
optimal actions policy for the 12 operating 




Cost Assumptions – Mr. Jim Guliani assisted in 
the development of the cost assumptions. 
Assumptions were based on average time spent 
for a human to find a patch for a vulnerability. Ms. 
Helen Patton provided key access and insights. 
Policy Generation Using Value Iteration: 
Where:  
𝑌1 = 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 
𝑝 = 𝐴 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑟 = 𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 
𝛾 = 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
𝑥 = 𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 
Expected Cost Minimization (Standard MDP): 
Optimal Objective 
Value 




Heat Map Policy 
CONCLUSIONS 
 1. An optimal policy can be derived from 
evaluating vulnerabilities on hosts and tracking 
them over time 
 
2. Implementing this policy based off of known 
probabilities can lead to an estimated $170,000 
in cost savings  
